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Abstract—Big data has been emerging as a new approach in
utilizing large datasets to optimize complex system operations.
Big data is fueled with Internet-of-Things (IoT) services that
generate immense sensory data from numerous sensors and
devices. While most current research focus of big data is on
machine learning and resource management design, the economic
modeling and analysis have been largely overlooked. This paper
thus investigates the big data market model and optimal pricing
scheme. We first study the utility of data from the data science
perspective, i.e., using the machine learning methods. We then
introduce the market model and develop an optimal pricing
scheme afterward. The case study shows clearly the suitability
of the proposed data utility functions. The numerical examples
demonstrate that big data and IoT service provider can achieve
the maximum profit through the proposed market model.
Index Terms—Machine learning, pricing, market, data-as-a-
service
I. INTRODUCTION
With an introduction of Internet of Things (IoT), a number
of devices are available and/or deployed to collect data. This
leads to a rapid growth of data volumes created. Together with
the advancement of telecommunication, computers, storage,
and algorithms, the data can be transferred, processed, stored,
and analyzed efficiently. This paradigm is known as big data.
In this paradigm, a large dataset is analyzed using different
algorithms including machine learning to extract useful knowl-
edge and information and to support services to businesses and
customers. A number of algorithms, tools, and services have
been proposed and developed to support big data management
and processing [1]. In this perspective, data is a precious
resource, and the concept of data-as-a-service (DaaS) has been
introduced [2]. In DaaS, data is considered as a commodity
that can be accessed and processed to obtain knowledge, used
in decision making. While the main stream research in big
data and DaaS focuses on developing algorithms of knowledge
extraction and resource management, subtle attention has been
paid to an economic perspective of big data. With an emerging
big data regime, market mechanisms and economic models
will be crucial not only to generate a revenue and optimize
resource utilization of different stockholders such as data
sources, big data brokers, and service providers, but also to
maximize the satisfaction of service users and knowledge
consumers.
Data can be treated as a resource that can be traded in a
market. With DaaS, data is acquired in an on-demand basis
depending on the requirements of users and consumers. The
goal of this paper is to introduce a suitable big data and IoT
market model. We first introduce some background of big data
analytics and data science to accentuate the importance of
data as a valuable resource for knowledge extraction. We then
propose candidate utility functions of data. We present a case
study of classification-based machine learning algorithms to
justify the concave increasing function of the utility function.
Next, we introduce a market model composed of sensors, data
source, service provider, and consumers (subscribers). The
optimal service subscription fee is derived based on the data
utility functions. The optimal pricing can be modeled as a
Stackelberg game to maximize the profit of the data source.
Finally, numerical results show the optimal subscription fee
and optimal data price. This paper serves as an initial study
to the economic analysis of big data and IoT systems.
II. RELATED WORK
Pricing is used as an economic mechanism not only for
revenue generation, but also for efficient resource allocation,
for example, in cloud resource [3], wireless network [4], and
IoT [5]. In big data and IoT era, data becomes a resource
that can be traded in a market. The authors in [6] discussed
different aspects of values of big data. They highlighted that
big data involves information goods which can be sold in
a market. The concept of data trading was presented, and
different issues, e.g., monopoly power due to differentiation
of data and information bundling, were outlined. Due to the
special nature of information goods, the concept of information
economics has been developed. The first issue is the method
to quantify value of information. The information has its value
when it is used in decision making. For example, the authors
in [7] analyzed the value of information in energy-constrained
intruder tracking sensor networks. The networks aim to iden-
tify and locate an intruder. If the network successfully detects
the intruder, the cost that can be avoided quantifies the value
of information. Based on the value of information analysis, the
pricing scheme of the information can be developed. In [8],
the authors developed a pricing scheme for information goods.
Two information access schemes, i.e., subscription and pay-
2per-use, were considered, and it was shown that there are
competitive prices that maximize profits of data sellers.
One of the applications of information pricing is in cognitive
radio. The authors in [9] introduced a pricing model for
spectrum sensing information. Secondary users obtain/buy the
information so that they can opportunistically access idle
licensed spectrum efficiently. However, none of the related
work considered the data demand and pricing especially when
the data is proposed and used to offer services. Thus, there is
an immediate need to develop such a big data market model
and optimal pricing scheme, which are the objectives of this
paper.
III. BIG DATA ANALYTICS AND UTILITY OF DATA
In this section, we describe the big data (data science)
approach. Then, we establish the generic utility functions of
data based on machine learning.
A. Big Data Analytics
Data
Model construction 
and training
Model testing
Data 
pre-processing
Machine 
learning model
Fig. 1: Knowledge discovery and extraction process of big
data [11].
Big data is a form of data science that aims to use a large
dataset to solve a real-world problem. Big data defines the
model-based approach to extract knowledge and information
that can be a solution of a specific problem of complex
systems. Such complex systems cannot be easily modeled
mathematically or simulated. Figure 1 shows a knowledge
discovery and extraction process of big data analytics. From
Fig. 1, raw data plays an important role in big data analytics in
that it is used to construct machine learning and data mining
models. From an economic perspective, in a simplest form,
we define a utility function of raw data as follows:
u = φ(n), (1)
which is a mapping from the raw data with size n items
to utility u. Machine learning and data mining algorithms
use raw data to train the model. Thus, the utility can be
considered as the quality of the model. For example, for
regression models, the utility is the accuracy to predict a real-
value target variable. Similarly, for classification, the utility is
the accuracy of classifying input into a discrete-value output. It
is well known that machine learning algorithms achieve better
accuracy when they are trained with more raw data [12]. Thus,
we make the following reasonable assumptions of the utility
function:
• φ′(n) > 0: utility is an increasing function;
• φ′′(n) ≤ 0: the function has decreasing marginal utility.
B. Case Study of Classification-Based Machine Learning
1) Classification-Based Machine Learning: To determine
the utility function of raw data in big data analytics, we
consider a case study of classification-based machine learning
algorithms. An annotated training (raw) data tuple has the form
(~xi, yi) ∈ RR×{1, . . . , C}, where ~x is a data vector of length
R, y is a tuple label from C possible classes, and i is an index.
The training data is collected as D = {(~xi, yi)|i = 1, . . . , n},
where n is the size of raw data to be used in model training.
Consider a classification learning model Ψ : ~xi → yˆi which
is trained on the raw data. The trained model maps input data
into a predicted label yˆi. An effective classifier is designed to
minimize the error between yi and yˆi. For example, minimize
the residual sum of squares, i.e., min
∑n
i=1 ‖yi − yˆi‖22.
2) Estimating Utility Functions: After the classifier model
is trained with the given raw data, it is tested to determine
the accuracy, e.g., using the separate sets of test data. The
classification error is defined as ǫj for raw data with size
nj , where j is the index of the test instance. Without loss
of generality, we assume that the utility, i.e., accuracy, is
uj = 1 − ǫj . To estimate the utility function φ(n), we vary
the size of raw data used in the model training. In particular,
the experiment points are (n1, ǫ1), . . . , (nj , ǫj), . . . , (nL, ǫL)
for nj < nj+1 and j = 1, . . . , L − 1. These points are then
used to find a set of optimal parameters of the candidate
utility function φ(n;α) by non-linear least squares, where α
contains the parameters. The non-linear least squares algorithm
optimizes α by minimizing the sum of square errors as follows:
min
α
L∑
j=1
(
ǫj −
(
1− φ(nj ;α)
))2
. (2)
We consider two candidate utility functions:
• The fraction-based function is defined as follows:
φ(n;α = [κ, g]) = 1− κ
1 + gn
, (3)
for κ1+gn ≤ 1, where κ and g are curve fitting parame-
ters. These fitting parameters are adjusted such that the
sum of the squared errors between the experimental and
estimated points is minimized.
• The exponential-based function is defined as follows:
φ(n;α = [µ, h]) = 1− µ exp(−hn), (4)
where µ and h are the fitting parameters.
C. Experimental Results
To justify the proposed the utility functions, we use a
real-world activity recognition dataset [13] of accelerometer
and gyroscope samples collected using waist-mounted smart
phones. The machine learning model is to classify human
activities including walking, going upstairs, going downstairs,
sitting, standing, and lying down. Data samples were collected
using Samsung Galaxy S II from 30 volunteers with a sam-
pling frequency of 50Hz. The dataset includes 561 calibrated
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Fig. 2: Estimation of the data-service quality function φ(n) using (a) support vector machines (κ = 1.109, g = 0.271, µ =
0.457, and h = 0.039), and (b) logistic regression (κ = 0.273, g = 0.044, µ = 0.21, and h = 0.017).
features extracted using a sliding window of 2.56sec. This win-
dow length helps detect varying-speed activities of people at
different ages. For the classification algorithm, we use logistic
regression and support vector machines (SVMs) with a radial
basis function kernel. Figure 2 shows the activity recognition
accuracy under different data sizes. Clearly, the recognition
accuracy increases as the size of training data increases.
Moreover, the increase of accuracy becomes diminishing when
the data size becomes larger. More importantly, the candidate
utility functions can well approximate the actual accuracy
results, rationalizing the concave increasing utility functions.
Note that in our these two experiments while the fraction-
based function fits the experimental results better than the
exponential-based function, the latter results in more tractable
derivation of the optimal pricing which will be presented in
Section V. Nonetheless, the conclustion cannot be made for
general cases, and further investigation is required.
We also observe similar diminishing increase of accuracy
for other machine learning algorithms such as k-nearest neigh-
bors and linear regression. However, due to space limit, we
omit them from the paper.
IV. BIG DATA MARKET MODEL
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Fig. 3: Big data market model.
We present and consider a typical big data market model as
shown in Fig. 3. In a simplest form, the market is composed of
the data source, service provider, and service consumers. The
data source is responsible for gathering, e.g., from sensors,
storing, maintaining, and transferring data to users. Alterna-
tively, a service provider can obtain the data, perform data
processing, e.g., machine learning and data mining algorithms,
and offer services to service users or consumers. Finally, the
consumers subscribe to the service offered by the provider.
The consumers pay a subscription fee denoted by ps to the
service provider. There are totally M users, and they decide
whether to subscribe to the service or not depending on their
willingness-to-pay to the service and the subscription fee. The
service provider buys raw data from the data source. The unit
price of the raw data is denoted by pb. The provider specifies
the size of requested data to buy, denoted by n, which is
defined as data demand to the data source. Here, the service
provider can set the subscription fee ps and the requested data
size n to buy so that its profit is maximized. The data source
can set the data price pb again so that its profit is maximized.
The big data market model can be applied to many big data
and IoT services.
• Placemeter (https://www.placemeter.com/) buys raw
video data containing scenes of street and city from
users. Placementer performs video analytics to extract
useful information, e.g., road traffic condition and crowd,
and sell the information to other businesses. Here, with
reference to the big data market model, a video camera
is the data source while Placemeter is the provider.
• IoT search engine: IoT search engine provides a generic
capability for users to acquire sensing data. Sensor own-
ers can share or sell sensing data to consumers. One
example is Thingful (https://thingful.net/) that lets sensors
be connected, and users can browse and obtain sensing
data. The IoT search engine is able to locate, index, and
make sensing data searchable. IoT sensors are the data
sources, and IoT search engine is the provider.
Pricing models of DaaS are classified into four main types:
(1) request-based, (2) volume-based, (3) data type-based, and
(4) corporate subscription models [10]. In this paper, our
proposed pricing scheme is the volume-based model in which
4the provider pays per size of data transferred from the data
sources. The optimal pricing schemes for request-based, data
type-based, and corporate subscription can be developed in the
future work.
V. OPTIMAL PRICING
We first derive the profit function of the service provider in
the big data market model. Then, the optimal data price of the
data source is obtained for two proposed utility functions.
A. Profit Function of Service Provider
We introduce an optimal pricing scheme for the big data
market model presented in Section IV. The service provider
decides on the amount of data to be purchased from the data
source and the subscription fee to charge the users. The service
users have different willingness-to-pay for the service. If the
willingness-to-pay of a user is higher than or equal to the
subscription fee charged by the service provider, the user will
buy (subscribe) the service. Let w denote willingness-to-pay
of a user to the service. The willingness-to-pay depends on
the service quality. Let w′ denote a nominal willingness-to-
pay. Then, the actual willingness-to-pay is w = φ(n)w′, where
φ(n) is the data utility function of the size of input data n used
in the machine learning algorithms. Similarly, let W ′ denote
the maximum nominal willingness-to-pay, and thus we have
W = φ(n)W ′ for the maximum actual willingness-to-pay.
Given a set of users, the probability density of the
willingness-to-pay is denoted by f(w), where w ∈ [0,W ].
Then, the expected profit of the service provider is computed
as follows:
F (n, ps) = psMPr(w ≥ ps)︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue
− pbn︸︷︷︸
cost
, (5)
= psM
∫ W
ps
f(w)dw − pbn, (6)
where the first term is the revenue gained from the subscribed
users who have the willingness-to-pay higher than the sub-
scription fee, and the second term is the cost paid to the data
source. We assume that the willingness-to-pay of the users
follows a uniform distribution between [0,W ′]. Thus, the profit
of the service provider can be expressed as follows:
F (n, ps) = psM(W − ps)− pbn, (7)
= psM(φ(n)W
′ − ps)− pbn, (8)
where φ(n) from Section III is adopted.
B. Optimal Subscription Fee of Service Provider
An optimization problem can be formulated to obtain an
optimal subscription fee and the size of raw data to be
purchased from the data source, i.e.,
max
n,ps
F (n, ps). (9)
We consider two cases of different data utility functions.
1) Case 1: When the data utility function φ(n) = 1 −
κ
1+gn is adopted, the profit function of the service provider is
expressed as follows:
F (n, ps) = psM
(
1− κ
1 + gn
− ps
)
− pbn, (10)
where without loss of generality, we set W ′ = 1. By differ-
entiating F (n, ps) with respect to n and ps, we have
∂F (n, ps)
∂n
=
gκMps
(gn+ 1)2
− pb = 0, (11)
∂F (n, ps)
∂ps
= Mps +M
(
ps +
κ
gn+ 1
− 1
)
= 0.(12)
The closed-form solutions of n∗ and p∗s exist. There are three
roots for the solutions, i.e.,
n∗1 =
MA2
pb
− 2M(A2)
2
pb
− 1
g
,
n∗2 = Real
(
κ/48− (A10)2/3 +A1
A9
+
gMA11/6 +A5 +A8 −A3 −A4 +A6
A7
)
,
n∗3 = Real
(
− (A10)
2/3 − κ/48 +A1
A9
gMA11/6 +A5 +A8 +A3 +A4 −A6
A7
)
, (13)
where Real(·) returns a real value, and
A1 =
√
3κi
48
, A2 =
1
36(A10)1/3
+ (A10)
1/3 +
1
3
,
A3 =
√
3gM(A10)
1/3i
216
, A4 =
√
3gM(A10)
4/3i,
A5 =
gM(A10)
1/3
216
, A6 =
√
3gMA11i
6
,
A7 = pbg(A10)
2/3, A8 = gM(A10)
4/3,
A9 = g(A10)
2/3, A10 = A11 +A12 − 1
216
,
A11 =
√
(A12 − 1/216)2 − 1/46656,
A12 = pbκ/8gM, (14)
and
p∗s1 =
(6B1 + 1)
2
36B1
, (15)
p∗s2 =
1
3
− B1
2
− 1
72B1
+
√
3
(
1
36B1
−B1
)
i
2
, (16)
p∗s3 =
1
3
− B1
2
− 1
72B1
−
√
3
(
1
36B1
−B1
)
i
2
,
where
B1 =
3
√√√√√( pbκ
8gM
− 1
216
)2
− 1
46656
+
pbκ
8gM
− 1
216
.
5Since the last terms of p∗s2 and p∗s3 are imaginary, the second
and third roots of p∗s is simply p∗s = 13 − B12 − 172B1 .
An optimal size of raw data to be purchased by the service
provider and the subscription fee are obtained from
(n∗, p∗s) = arg max
(n,ps)∈{n∗1 ,n
∗
2
,n∗
3
}×{p∗s1,p
∗
s2,p
∗
s3}
F (n, ps). (17)
We can consider the special cases that the size of raw data is
fixed or the subscription fee is fixed. The former corresponds
to the case that the data source has a fixed amount of raw
data to supply, and the service provider optimizes only the
subscription fee. In contrast, the latter corresponds to the case
that the subscription fee is fixed, and the service provider
optimizes only the size of raw data to be purchased. We have
the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If n is fixed, the solution p∗s of the problem in
(9) is globally optimal. In contrast, if ps is fixed, the solution
n∗ of the problem in (9) is globally optimal.
Proof: We obtain the second derivatives of F (n, ps) , i.e.,
∂2F (n, ps)
∂p2s
= −2M, (18)
∂2F (n, ps)
∂n2
= −2g
2κMps
(ng + 1)3
, (19)
which are non-positive. Therefore, the solutions of the special
cases are globally optimal.
2) Case 2: When the data utility function 1−µ exp(−hd) is
adopted, the profit function of the service provider is expressed
as follows:
F (n, ps) = psM (1− µ exp(−hn)− ps)− pbn. (20)
By differentiating F (n, ps) with respect to n and ps, we have
∂F (n, ps)
∂n
= hµMps exp(−hn)− pb = 0, (21)
∂F (n, ps)
∂ps
= M(2ps + µ exp(−hn)− 1) = 0. (22)
The closed-form solutions of n∗ and p∗s exist. There are two
roots for the solutions, i.e.,
n∗ =
ln
(
hµM
4pb
± hµM
√
1
4
−
2pb
hM
2pb
)
h
, (23)
and
p∗s =
1
4
±
√
1− 8pbhM
4
. (24)
Again, we consider the special cases that n is fixed or ps
is fixed. The second derivatives of F (n, ps) are
∂2F (n, ps)
∂p2s
= −2M, (25)
∂2F (n, ps)
∂n2
= −h2µMps exp(−hn), (26)
which are non-positive. Therefore, the solutions of the special
cases are globally optimal.
C. Optimal Pricing Scheme of Data Source
The data source can adjust data price pb so that its profit is
maximized. We can formulate a Stackelberg game to model
this situation.
• The leader player is the data source, the strategy of
which is data price pb. The payoff is the profit defined as
P (pb) = pbn(pb). Here, the size of data to be purchased
n(pb) is defined as a function of pb.
• The follower player is the service provider, the strategy
of which is the amount of data to be purchased and the
subscription fee. The payoff is profit F (n, ps) defined as
(5).
The Stackelberg equilibrium is defined as follows:
p∗b = argmaxpb
pbn(pb), (27)
s.t. n(pb) = argmax
n,ps
F (n, ps). (28)
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
We consider the data utility function φ(n) = 1 − κ1+gn
to obtain the representative numerical results of the optimal
pricing scheme. We use the following setting: the number
of users is 500. We adopt the fitted parameters as shown in
Fig. 2(a). Note that similar results can be obtained for the other
utility function with different classification machine learning
algorithms.
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Fig. 4: Profit of service provider under varied requested data
sizes and subscription fee strategies.
Figure 4 shows the profit of the service provider when under
different requested data sizes and subscription fee strategies.
When the requested data size is small, the service quality
is poor and the utility is low, and thus only few users will
subscribe the service from the provider. However, if the
requested data size is large, the service quality becomes better,
but the provider has to pay more for the data. Likewise, if
the subscription fee is high, only few users will subscribe the
service, resulting in a small revenue. By contrast, if the fee
6is low, the profit will be adversely affected. Clearly, there is
a maximum profit which can be achieved when the optimal
requested data size and subscription fee are applied. These
optimal solutions can be obtained from the presented closed-
form expressions.
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Fig. 5: Optimal requested data size and profit of data source
under varied data price.
Figure 5 shows the optimal requested data size, which
represents demand from the service provider to the data source.
Clearly, as the data price increases, the demand decreases.
Given this demand function, the figure also shows the profit
of the data source. Again, there is an optimal profit that can be
achieved when an optimal data price is applied. This optimal
data price as well as the optimal requested data size and
subscription fee form the Stackelberg equilibrium points for
the data source, i.e., a leader, and the service provider, i.e., a
follower, respectively.
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Fig. 6: Optimal requested data size and profit of data source
under varied model parameter g.
Next, we vary some model parameters of the data utility
function. By increasing g, the data-service quality improves
faster given the same size of data used in the machine learning
algorithm. Thus, from Fig. 6, the requested data size or
demand decreases. Here, to maximize the profit, the data
source can raise the data price.
VII. SUMMARY
In this paper, we have studied economic issues of big data
and IoT. Specifically, we have proposed utility functions of
data when the data is used in big data analytics. Through the
case study of classification-based machine learning algorithms,
the suitability of the functions has been demonstrated. Next,
we have introduced a big data market model, which is com-
posed of a data source, a service provider, and users. Based
on the data utility functions, we have developed an optimal
pricing scheme that allows the service provider to determine
the amount of data to be acquired to provide services to
the users. Additionally, we have shown that the Stackelberg
game can model the strategy of the data source to achieve the
maximum profit.
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